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DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW

I. Introduction
In this survey period the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's analysis of vertical nonprice restraints. The
Tenth Circuit had ruled in Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International,
Inc. I that a manufacturer's refusal to grant a dealership to a distributor
was not a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act,2 even
though the refusal came at the urging of a competing distributor. The
Tenth Circuit held that " 'in the absence of any evidence of intent to
raise prices .. .an agreement whereby a supplier of some good or service refuses, at the behest of one of his distributors, to deal with a competitor of that distributor is not illegal per se.' -3 This approach to
vertical nonprice restraints had been used in the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits; it was in contrast to the approach of the Third and4
Ninth Circuits, which had held that such refusals were per se violations.
This conflict between the circuits was resolved when the 5Supreme Court
decided Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
II.

WESTMAN COMMISSION Co. v. HOBART INTERNATIONAL, INC.:

A
A.

SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS

Background

Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International,Inc. arose out of a distributor's claim that a manufacturer's refusal to grant it a dealership was
an illegal restraint of trade. 6 Hobart International, Inc. ("Hobart"), a
manufacturer of food service equipment, sells its products through approximately 540 independent dealers in the United States and is considered to be "the preeminent manufacturer" in the industry. 7 Hobart had
to grant
eight dealers in the Denver, Colorado area at the time it refused
8
dealership.
a
("Westman")
Company
Commission
Westman
Westman, a wholesale grocery supplier, had entered the food service equipment supply business in 1973 by purchasing the assets of the
WE-4 division of Wilscam Enterprises, Inc. 9 The WE-4 division had disI.

796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).

At the district

court level, Westman was bifurcated into liability (Westman I) and damages (Westman II) segments. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. 627 (D. Colo. 1978), is discussed in this article.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1223 (quoting Products Liability Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982)).
4. See Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Zidell
Exploration, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
5. 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).
6. 461 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. Colo. 1978), rev'd, 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
7. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 628.
8. Id. at 629.
9. Id. at 628.
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tributed Hobart products on an informal basis' ° before it was acquired
by Westman. Westman also distributed Hobart products on this basis
after it acquired the WE-4 division and attempted to conclude a formal
dealership agreement with Hobart."I However, after complaints by another Hobart dealer in the area, Hobart ultimately informed Westman
2
that it did not intend to offer Westman a dealership.'
Westman brought a private action under section one of the Sherman Act, 13 alleging that Hobart and Nobel, the competing distributor,
had conspired to keep Westman out of the food service equipment supply market.14 Nobel was Hobart's most successful dealer in the area and
had urged Hobart to deny Westman a dealership, claiming that the addi15
tional dealership would jeopardize Hobart's relationship with Nobel.
The district court determined that the relevant market was "onestop shopping,"' 16 and held that Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a
dealership had the effect of excluding Westman from the market.17 The
court held that this refusal to deal, at Nobel's prompting, was a conspiracy in restraint of trade and thus a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 18
Although the court had found a per se violation, it went on to perform a 'rule of reason' analysis of Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a
dealership.1 9 In applying a 'rule of reason' analysis, a court must consider what procompetitive benefits are made available as a result of the
alleged anticompetitive practice.2 0 Hobart claimed that its refusal to
grant Westman a dealership was based on several reasons: that it "had
doubts about Westman's ability to pay for Hobart purchases," that it
10. "Although Hobart had been accepting orders from the WE-4 division as if it were
a formal Hobart dealer, a sales agreement form had never been signed by Wilscam Enterprises." Id. at 629.
11. Id. at 630.
12. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.
14. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1219.
15. Id.
16. This is "a recognized distinct market wherein a purveyor can supply a customer in
the institutional food service or restaurant business with all requisite equipment and supplies." Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. 627, 628 (1978), rev'd, 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
17. Id. at 636.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The 'rule of reason' was first stated by justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
Id. at 238.
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"had adequate coverage in the [Denver] area," and that it "doubted
Westman's loyalty to the Hobart line."'2 1 The court determined that
these reasons for denying Westman the dealership were but a pretext
22
for an anticompetitive purpose.
B.

Analysis: The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The district court's opinion was appealed by Hobart to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 23 The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by
24
Judge Monroe McKay, reversed the lower court without remanding.
At the outset of its opinion the court stated that the purpose of the
antitrust laws was "the promotion of consumer welfare" 25 and that it
would consider Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a dealership in terms
of its effect on consumers rather than competitors. 26 The court examined the district court's conclusion that Hobart had excluded Westman from the market and determined that the lower court had
misidentified the relevant product and geographic markets. The product market was not strictly "full-line distribution"; nor was the geographic market limited to the Denver area. 2 7 The appellate court held
that these conclusions were the result of identifying the market from the
28
perspective of the distributor rather than the consumer.
Although Hobart had not excluded Westman from the market, it
had terminated Westman as a distributor in response to Nobel's threat
that making Westman a dealer would "jeopardize" Hobart's relationship
with Nobel. 29 The appellate court thus had to consider the agreement
between Hobart and Nobel, and determine whether Hobart's refusal to
deal was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
The court noted that other circuits had split on the question of
whether a manufacturer's refusal to deal with a distributor was a per se
violation when the refusal came at the urging of a competing distributor.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had held that refusals to deal
were not per se violations; the Third and Ninth Circuits had held that
they were. 30 The court stated that it agreed with those circuits that re31
jected the per se approach.
After reviewing the basis for various circuit rulings, it pointed out
that the rationale for applying the per se approach was almost always the
21. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 637.
22. Id. at 636.
23. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
24. Id. at 1228.
25. Id. at 1220.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1220-22.
28. Id. at 1220-21.
29. Id. at 1221.
30. Id. at 1223.
31. "After weighing the conflicting authorities, we choose to align ourselves with the
Seventh Circuit." Id. at 1222-1223. The Fifth Circuit had also rejected the per se approach. Id. at 1223.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

662

[Vol.. 66:4

presence of price-fixing motives.3 2 The court stated that its rejection of
the per se approach was supported by the recent Supreme Court decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.3 3 "In Monsanto, the Court
held that a plaintiff could not survive a directed verdict by merely establishing that a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting distributor in response to complaints of a competing distributor. ' 34 Quoting from the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.,35 the court emphasized that "[n]othing in Monsanto suggests that
liability can be found without any evidence of a price fixing agreement.
Rather the language of Monsanto can only indicate the Court's belief that
a pricefixing agreement is a requirementfor per se liability in distributor termi36
nation cases."
Applying this approach to Hobart's refusal to grant Westman a
dealership, the Tenth Circuit stated that "[s]ince the record reveals not
the slightest hint of price maintenance or price fixing, Hobart's refusal
37
to deal cannot be illegal per se."
The court then explained why a 'rule of reason' analysis was particularly appropriate to refusal-to-deal cases. It pointed out that "sound
economic theory" supported "allow[ing] suppliers wide latitude in selecting their distributors" 38 and that the Supreme Court had recognized
this in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.3 9 "[E]ven though these refusals to deal may limit intrabrand competition, they are likely to benefit
consumers by increasing interbrand rivalry."' 40 Some of the procompetitive effects of refusals to deal are "allowing each distributor to achieve
economies of scale and to spread out fixed costs over a large amount of
products," "facilitat[ing] the entry of new manufacturers into the market," "encourag[ing] distributors to provide promotional activities, consumer information, and product service," and "reduc[ing] transaction
costs .... "41

III.

BUSINESS ELECTRONICS CORP. V. SHARP ELECTRONICS CORP.

In its rationale for rejecting the per se approach to vertical nonprice
restraints, the Tenth Circuit cited the Fifth Circuit's "extensive and well42
reasoned" opinion in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
Business Electronics was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court and the
Court's opinion was dispositive not only of that case, but also of Hobart
32. Id.
33. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
34. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
35. 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
36. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1224 (quoting Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780
F.2d 1212, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1226.
39. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
40. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1227.
41. Id.
42. 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), ajfd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
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43
and another case.

A.

Background

Business Electronics Corporation was the sole retailer of Sharp
electronic calculators and business equipment in the Houston area until
1972, when Sharp appointed Gilbert Hartwell as a second retailer. After
Hartwell had sold Sharp products for a while, he began to complain to
Sharp about Business Electronics' price cutting: Hartwell complained
that Business Electronics was " 'free riding' on Hartwell's investment in
product promotion and other sales-related services."' 44 Eventually
Hartwell gave Sharp an ultimatum: terminate Business Electronics as a
retailer, or Hartwell would cease to sell Sharp products. Sharp termi45
nated Business Electronics.
Business Electronics brought an action alleging that Sharp had violated section one of the Sherman Act 4 6 by agreeing with Hartwell to
terminate Business Electronics. 4 7 Sharp responded to these allegations
by claiming that it had terminated Business Electronics for several reasons not related to any attempt to set resale prices. These included disfailure to meet sale quotas, as well
satisfaction with Business Electronics'
48
as its discounting practices.
The issue of liability was submitted to the jury as an instruction that
there is a per se violation of the Sherman Act when a supplier agrees to
49
terminate a price cutting dealer at the prompting of another dealer.
The jury found that there was an agreement between Sharp and Hart50
well to terminate Business Electronics because of its price cutting.
Analysis: The Fifth Circuit Opinion

B.

On appeal Sharp presented several issues to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. In addition to whether the trial court's application
of a per se standard was correct, there were also evidentiary questions
and a question regarding the computation of damages. 5 1 Chief Judge
Clark, writing for the court, began this analysis by pointing out that the
trial court's finding, "which [did] not require an agreement between
43. McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323, 329 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
44. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1215 (5th Cir. 1986),
afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988). "Free riding" is a practice that allows one distributor to take
advantage of a competing distributor's expenditures on promotion and services for a
product. The free riding distributor is able to sell the product at a lower price because it
does not have the cost of the promotion and services it can rely on its competitor to
provide.
45. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (5th Cir.
1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
46. See supra note 13.
47. Business Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1214.
48. Id. at 1215.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1214.
51.

Id.
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Sharp and Hartwell to maintain resale prices, is an incorrect one." 5 2
The court noted precedent within the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere
that supported its reversal of the district court. 53 It then addressed the
fact that two other circuits had taken a contrary view. In Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp. ,54 the Third Circuit held that a manufacturer's termination of a dealer in order to protect a requesting dealer was per se
illegal. 5 5 ChiefJudge Clark pointed out that the rationale for the Cernuto
decision was that "if the manufacturer and dealer wish to protect the
dealer from price competition then they must intend that prices be
higher once the price cutting dealer is terminated."'56 Chief Judge
Clark then delineated his reasons for disagreeing with this standard. He
began by stating that the effect of terminating a price cutter "may be to
raise prices but this is equally true of the granting of an exclusive dealership, which we have held not to be per se illegal." 5 7 He next showed
how this fit in with recent Supreme Court decisions in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp. 58 and Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania. 59
The court concluded by stating that "in order for a manufacturer's
termination of a distributor to be illegal per se, it must be pursuant to a
60
price maintenance agreement with another distributor."1
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE SPLIT

The Supreme Court opinion by Justice Scalia began with the Court
acknowledging that certiorari was granted to hear Business Electronics "to
resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals regarding the proper dividing
line between the rule that vertical price restraints are illegal per se and
the rule that vertical nonprice restraints are to be judged under the rule
of reason."'6 1 The opinion then proceeds to draw that line, yet all the
while draw away from it.
After recounting the history of the case, the Court stated that the
Sherman Act "prohibit[ed] only unreasonable restraints of trade" 62 and
that "per se rules are appropriate only for 'conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive.' ",63 It pointed out that in its Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania decision, it had refused to apply a per se rule to a manufacturer's
termination of one dealer in connection with an exclusive territory
52. Id. at 1215.
53. See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980); Aladdin Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979); St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan
Yacht, Inc., 457 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).

54.
55.
56,
57.
58.
59.

595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 170.
Business Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
465 U.S. 752 (1984).
433 U.S. 36 (1977).

60. Business Electronics, 780 F.2d at 1218 (emphasis in original).

61. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1517 (1988).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)).
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agreement with another dealer. 64 Application of a per se standard was
to be "based on demonstrable economic effect rather than ...

formalis-

tic line drawing." '65 In GTE Sylvania the Court determined that vertical
nonprice restraints did not facilitate cartelization. Rather, "they had
real potential to stimulate interbrand competition, 'the primary concern
of the antitrust laws.' ,66
The Court emphasized the importance it gave to the GTE Sylvania
decision: "We have been solicitous to assure that the market-freeing
effect of our decision in GTE Sylvania is not frustrated by related legal
rules." '6 7 It then stated that applying a per se rule in the circumstances
of Business Electronics "would threaten to dismantle the doctrine of GTE
Sylvania" as well as "discourage conduct... recognized as beneficial to
consumers." 68 The Court concluded by stating that the Fifth Circuit
was correct in applying the 'rule of reason' to refusals to deal when there
69
has been no agreement as to price or price levels.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Business Electronics accomplishes
more than the resolution of a split in the Courts of Appeal. Vertical
nonprice restraints will now be considered under a 'rule of reason' analysis unless there has been some showing of an agreement as to price or
price levels. 70 Along with narrowing the application of per se analysis,
the Court has provided a method of analysis for approaching vertical
nonprice restraints. This method, as stated in Business Electronics, is as
follows:
[T]here is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard;
departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable
economic effect, such as the facilitation of cartelizing ...

inter-

brand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws;
and that rules in this area should be formulated7 1 with a view
towards protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania.
Patrick Stack Leslie

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. (quoting Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)).
Id. (quoting GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)).
Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1521, 1523.
Id. at 1525.
Id.
Id. at 1520-21.

